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We study the factors behind split ratings in sovereign credit ratings from different agencies, for 
the period 1980-2015. We employ random effects ordered and simple probit approaches to 
assess the explanatory power of different macroeconomic, government and financial variables. 
Our results show that structural balances and the existence of a default in the last ten years were 
the least significant variables whereas the level of net debt, budget balances, GDP per capita 
and the existence of a default in the last five years were found to be the most relevant variables 
explaining rating mismatches across agencies. For speculative-grade ratings, we also find that 
a default in the last two or five years decreases the rating difference between S&P and Fitch. 
For the positive rating difference between S&P and Moody’s for investment-grade ratings, an 
increase in external debt leads to a smaller rating gap between the two agencies 
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In the current global financial system, credit rating agencies play a crucial role in 
reducing information asymmetries in the financial markets and more recently also provide a 
fundamental input to the financial institutions risk assessment required by regulators, since 
capital requirements are calculated by applying to the institution financial assets a weighting 
factor depending on the associated credit rating. Sovereign credit ratings summarise in an 
ordinal qualitative scale a complex and thorough analysis of the ability a country has to service 
its debt. Since institutional investors nowadays are only allowed to acquire financial assets 
above a certain rating, countries willing to issue debt are in practice obliged to pay for a credit 
rating. 
With the globalization of financial markets and the proliferation of credit ratings, rating 
agencies assigning different credit ratings to the same country became more frequent. Our 
contribution is twofold: first, we set up the possible pairs of rating mismatches across the three 
main rating agencies for 105 countries, highlighting persistent split ratings; second, we analysed 
the rating differences between S&P, Moody’s and Fitch in the light of a random-effects probit 
framework and using as explanatory variables a set of macroeconomic variables found in the 
literature as important determinants of sovereign ratings. 
Our ordered probit results found, for every dataset used, that the structural balance did 
not contribute to any rating difference here considered. Only the simple probit regressions found 
that structural balances explain some of the split ratings. The structural balance and the default 
in the last ten years were the least significant across all our regressions, whereas the level of net 
debt, budget balances, per capita GDP and a default in the last five years contribute in more 
than 20% of the regressions to the rating differences. In addition, for speculative-grade ratings, 
we find that a default in the last two or five years decreases the rating difference between S&P 
and Fitch. For the positive rating difference between S&P and Moody’s for investment-grade 
ratings, an increase in external debt leads to a smaller rating gap between the two agencies 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two provides the literature 
review; section three explains the methodology; section four discusses the results of the 




In spite of being a century old,1 credit ratings only began to play a role in US financial 
market regulation in 1931, and over time the reliance by regulators on the information conveyed 
by ratings increased. According to Levich et al. (2012), this increasing usage led, in 1975, to 
the establishment of guidelines by the US Securities and Exchange Commission for designating 
National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs). Given the growing 
globalization of banking and financial markets since the 1970s, the Bank for International 
Settlements established a set of risk-based capital adequacy levels, which in 1999 were revised 
to explicitly consider credit ratings in determining a bank’s risk capital. 
According to Bhatia (2002), the first sovereign credit ratings were issued by Moody’s “just 
before World War I”.2 Before the Great Depression, the predecessor of S&P rated bonds from 
21 national governments in Europe, South America, North America and Asia. Most sovereign 
ratings were then suspended during World War II and only after the war, S&P and Moody’s 
began again to rate bonds issued by major industrialized countries. The withdrawal in 1974 of 
a tax applied to foreign borrowers in 1963 in the US which had driven bond market activity out 
of the US, marked the beginning of the modern sovereign credit ratings era. 
Amstad and Packer (2015) define sovereign ratings as “opinions about the creditworthiness 
of sovereign borrowers that indicate the relative likelihood of default on their outstanding debt 
obligations”. These ratings, like the ratings about other types of credit, try to assess both the 
ability and willingness of the borrower to pay. To accomplish this, qualitative factors, like 
institutional strength and the rule of law, and quantitative factors, like measures of fiscal and 
economic strength, the monetary regime, foreign exchange reserves, are analysed to rate a 
sovereign issuer. Kiff et al. (2012) state that ratings are not only about credit risk but also 
convey information about credit stability (changes in credit risk), and the assessments 
represented by ratings are medium-term outlooks that should not change due to the impact of 
cyclical components. Rating volatility should be minimized by rating agencies by assessing 
through the cycle: a rating should be changed only to reflect a shift in fundamental factors (and 
consequently a change in basic creditworthiness), and not as a response to a recession or a 
global liquidity shortage, for example. Kiff et al. (2012) description of this approach is 
particularly accurate: “vulnerability to cycles affects the rating decision, whereas the current 
position in the cycle does not”. 
                                                 
1 John Moody founded the first rating agency in 1909, in the United States, and their first ratings were entirely for 
the bonded debts of US railroads (see Sylla, 2002). 
2 In our rating dataset the oldest sovereign rating, a ‘AAA’ rating, was given by S&P to Finland in April 1972. 
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Bhatia (2002) affirms that the widespread use by investors of the credit ratings attributed 
by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody's Investors Service (Moody’s) and Fitch Ratings (Fitch) 
reflects their utility for the market. This usefulness results from the simplicity and comparability 
of the rating systems used by those rating agencies, condensing detailed analysis into brief 
indicators, and from the “perceived analytical strength and independence of the agencies 
themselves”.3 Issuers pay for the ratings, expecting to attract more investors, or simply to obtain 
an assessment of their risk, often asking more than one agency for a rating at the same time. On 
the other hand, investors incorporate ratings in their decision process (pricing calculations, 
decisions to buy, sell or hold), turning credit ratings into an integral part of today’s capital 
markets. 
A sovereign credit rating normally serves as the “ceiling” of the ratings within its territory, 
since the sovereign bond yields are considered riskless and therefore used as a benchmark 
against which returns on domestic investments are compared. In parallel, each sovereign 
creditworthiness is compared with the most trustworthy issuers (rated with an ‘AAA’ rating), 
and among those is the German government, whose bonds are regarded as one of the global 
risk-free benchmarks. Given the increasing connectedness of the capital markets, the growing 
issuance of bonded debt and the regulatory role of sovereign ratings on investors risk 
management, changes in sovereign ratings can have profound implications. 
Both the Asian crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2007-08 highlighted flaws 
in the rating systems. In the first case, a rating approach based only on macroeconomic 
fundamentals was the culprit, revealing the importance of contingent liabilities and the 
international liquidity position of the issuers (Bhatia (2002)). In the latter case, and according 
to Brunnermeier (2009), one of the deciding factors contributing to the latest financial crisis 
was the collaboration between banks and rating agencies to ensure their structured debt products 
(often called collateralized debt obligations (CDO)), had always a tranche reaching the ‘AAA’ 
rating, even if the underlying default risk was not equivalent to the default risk associated with 
a ‘AAA’ bond rating. Fund managers were attracted to buying these structured products 
offering seemingly high expected returns with an acceptable level of risk, and when the quality 
of the securitized assets deteriorated (signalled by a spike in the default rate of the so-called 
subprime mortgages), every holder inevitably faced losses and eventually had to write-down a 
significant part of their mortgage-related securities. 
                                                 
3 Table II compares the rating scales of the three main credit rating agencies. 
5 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, Amstad 
and Packer (2015) highlight the changes in the sovereign risk methodologies used by the major 
rating agencies. These rating methodologies explain which factors drive the evaluation of the 
likelihood of default. A common principle to these revisions is that agencies tried to adopt 
assessment systems more reliant on quantitative inputs, to make ratings more transparent and 
replicable4. 
Moody’s rating methodology will now be analysed, to illustrate how the rating 
methodologies are now more reliant on quantitative inputs. Moody’s Investors Service (2015) 
explains how it bases its sovereign credit risk assessment on the “interplay” of four key factors: 
economic strength, institutional strength, fiscal strength and susceptibility to event risk. The 
following figure show how Moody’s broad factors interact to ultimately produce a sovereign 
credit rating. 
Figure 1 - Key factors affecting Moody's credit risk assessment. 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2015). 
 
These broad rating factors are subdivided into sub-factors, each with a different weight 
towards the broad factor. 
The transparency achieved by the revision of the Moody’s risk assessment methodology 
is illustrated by Cantor (2012), who showed that using the indicators underlying each factor and 
their weights as a scorecard, one could predict 70% of Moody’s bond ratings within two notches 
and explain 67% of the variation in bond ratings. 
Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) associate the growing importance of credit rating 
agencies to the increasing number of issuers and debt products, and globalization, but also to 
the requirements applied to institutional investors, banks and financial institutions: the first ones 
are only allowed to trade debt securities rated by NRSROs, whereas the latter, stemming from 
                                                 
4 Amstad and Packer (2015) find that ratings can be largely explained by a relatively small set of fewer than 10 
variables, in line with the results of previous studies. 
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the Basel II Accord, are obliged to use external credit ratings to assess their credit risks and to 
determine capital adequacy requirements. 
Table I provides further detail about how Moody’s arranges sub-factors into each broad 
rating factor. 
The transparency achieved by the revision of the Moody’s risk assessment methodology 
is illustrated by Cantor (2012), who showed that using the indicators underlying each factor and 
their weights as a scorecard, one could predict 70% of Moody’s bond ratings within two notches 
and explain 67% of the variation in bond ratings. 
Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) associate the growing importance of credit rating 
agencies to the increasing number of issuers and debt products, and globalization, but also to 
the requirements applied to institutional investors, banks and financial institutions: the first ones 
are only allowed to trade debt securities rated by NRSROs, whereas the latter, stemming from 
the Basel II Accord, are obliged to use external credit ratings to assess their credit risks and to 
determine capital adequacy requirements. 
Table I - Identification of Moody's key rating factors and corresponding sub-factors. 
Broad rating factors Rating sub-factor 
Factor 1: Economic strength Growth dynamics 
Scale of the economy 
National income 
Factor 2: Institutional strength Institutional framework and effectiveness 
Policy credibility and effectiveness 
Factor 3: Fiscal strength Debt burden 
Debt affordability 
Factor 4: Susceptibility to event risk Political risk 
Government liquidity risk 
Banking sector risk 
External vulnerability risk 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2015). Note: each sub-factor encompasses one or more indicator, like average 
real GDP growth and volatility, nominal GDP, GDP per capita, inflation level and volatility, etc. 
 
The determinants of sovereign credit ratings are an object of study since the seminal 
work of Cantor and Packer (1996), a cross sectional OLS estimation which identified per capita 
income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default 
history as important determinants of sovereign ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P. This 
methodology was also used by Afonso (2003), which also included a logistic and an exponential 
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transformation of the ratings, in addition to the linear transformation already used. Mulder and 
Monfort (2000) and Eliasson (2002) generalized the OLS approach to panel data, both using a 
linear transformation of the ratings. 
On the other hand, and to overcome the limitation of OLS regressions with a linear 
transformation of the ratings, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) used an ordered probit model for 
a period of five years and 95 countries.5 
Afonso et al. (2008) analysed the determinants of sovereign ratings from the three main 
agencies by using a linear regression framework (random effects estimation, pooled OLS 
estimation and fixed effects estimation) versus an ordered probit response framework. 6 In 
addition, Afonso et al. (2011) confirm that logistic and exponential transformations to ratings 
provide little improvement over the linear transformation, not finding evidence of the so-called 
“cliff effects” (when investors adjust their portfolio composition to select only investment grade 
securities). This work also highlights the difference between short- and long-term determinants, 
concluding that GDP per capita, GDP growth, government debt and budget balance have a 
short-term impact, whereas government effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves and 
default history influence ratings in the long-run. 
Starting with Cantor and Packer (1996) selection of macroeconomic variables, the work 
from different authors that followed progressively converged into a subset of determinants, 
present in every study here analysed: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, external 
debt, the level of public debt and the government budget balance were found to predominantly 
explain the rating scale. In line with the results of previous studies, the recent work of Amstad 
and Packer (2015), used several explanatory variables as proxies for fiscal, economic and 
institutional strength, monetary regime, external position and default history and also concludes 
that a small set of factors can largely explain the rating scale. 
3. Methodology 
To understand which factors may explain split sovereign ratings and if some of those 
factors are considered more relevant by certain agencies, we propose to analyse the collected 
dataset using a random-effects probit regression framework. 
                                                 
5 An OLS regression with a linear transformation of the ratings assumes a constant distance between adjacent 
rating notches. However, ratings represent a qualitative ordinal assessment of a sovereign credit risk, thus the 
distance between two adjacent ratings may not be the same 
6 Instead of assuming a rigid shape of the ratings scale, this model estimates the threshold values between rating 
notches, defining the shape of the ratings curve. 
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The source of the information used to create the dependent variables were the rating 
changes for long-term sovereign foreign currency ratings obtained from Bloomberg for the 
three main credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody's, and Fitch Ratings). For each 
country and for each year, the last rating change of the year was selected as that country's year 
rating. Years without any rating change were filled by extending the rating of the previous year 
and rating withdrawals by the rating agencies were ignored, since the rating given before the 
withdrawal keeps its relevance for the markets. 
The qualitative rating given by the rating agencies were then converted into a numerical 
scale, from 0 to 21, where 21 corresponded to the ‘AAA’ from S&P and Fitch/‘Aaa’ from 
Moody's and 0 corresponded to a (selective) default, using the correspondence in Table II. 
 
Table II - A comparison between rating agencies qualitative scales. 
Rating number S&P Moody’s Fitch 
21 (Highest credit 
rating) 
AAA Aaa AAA 
20 AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
19 AA Aa2 AA 
18 AA- Aa3 AA- 
17 A+ A1 A+ 
16 A A2 A 
15 A- A3 A- 
14 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
13 BBB Baa2 BBB 
12 BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
11 BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
10 BB Ba2 BB 
9 BB- Ba3 BB- 
8 B+ B1 B+ 
7 B B2 B 
6 B- B3 B- 
5 CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
4 CCC Caa2 CCC 
3 CCC- Caa4 CCC- 
2 CC Ca CC 
1 C C C 
0 SD/D  DDD/D
D/D 
Note: According to S&P Global Ratings (2016), Moody’s Investors Service (2016), Fitch Ratings (2014), we 
considered a numerical sovereign rating of 12 or above to be an investment-grade rating, whereas a rating below 




Our six dependent variables − Diff_UPitSF, Diff_DWitSF, Diff_UPitMF, Diff_DWitMF, 
Diff_UPit
SM and Diff_DWitSM − represent the difference in ratings between the credit rating 
agencies considered in this work. Their definition follows: 
• Diff_UPitSF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by S&P and 
Fitch, when S&P rating was higher or equal than Fitch’s rating for the pair (country i, 
year t); 
• Diff_DWitSF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by S&P and 
Fitch, when S&P rating was lower or equal than Fitch’s rating for the pair (country i, 
year t); 
• Diff_UPitMF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by Moody’s 
and Fitch, when Moody’s rating was higher or equal than Fitch’s rating for the pair 
(country i, year t); 
• Diff_DWitMF. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by 
Moody’s and Fitch, when Moody’s rating was lower or equal than Fitch’s rating for the 
pair (country i, year t); 
• Diff_UPitSM. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by S&P and 
Moody’s, when S&P rating was higher or equal than Moody’s rating for the pair 
(country i, year t); 
• Diff_DWitSM. It represents the difference between the numeric ratings given by S&P 
and Moody’s, when S&P rating was lower or equal than Moody’s rating for the pair 
(country i, year t) 
As an example, let RitX represent the rating from credit rating agency X for the country i in 
year t and consider the dependent variable Diff_UPitSM, representing the difference between 
S&P and Moody’s ratings: Diff_UPitSM = RitS - RitM, when RitS >= RitM. If Diff_UPitSM > 0, then 
S&P considers country i, in time t, more capable of fulfilling its debt obligations than what 
Moody’s finds about the capacity of country i to pay its debt. 
This work reports on the results produced by an ordered and a simple probit models and as 
a result, the values of the dependent variables were transformed accordingly: the target variables 
of the ordered probit model may assume the values 0, 1 or 2 (as defined by equation (3)), 





3.1. Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables used in this study were selected according to the existing 
literature on the determinants of sovereign ratings, where we find previous papers trying to 
estimate the predictors of sovereign debt rating notations using both linear (see Cantor and 
Packer (1996), Afonso (2003), Afonso et al. (2011)) and ordered response models (see Afonso 
et al. (2008), Afonso et al. (2011)). According to these papers, the predictors which better 
explain the rating scale are: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, external debt, 
government debt and the government budget balance. 
In addition to the mentioned predictors7, this work also considered as explanatory variables 
the government structural balance, inflation and the default history of a country. Here follows 
the list of explanatory variables used in this work (0 describes in more detail each one of these, 
along with its corresponding source and how each variable was created): 
• Budget balance. Overall difference between government revenues and spending. 
Successive budget deficits may signal problems with the implemented policies; 
• Structural balance. By decomposing the budget balance into its cyclical and non-
cyclical components, one can better understand the cyclical influences on the budget 
balance. Changes in the non-cyclical, or structural, component, may be indicative of 
discretionary policy adjustments; 
• Gross debt. Summation of all liabilities that will require payments of interest and/or 
principal by the government; 
• Net debt. Net debt is calculated as gross debt minus the financial assets a government 
holds; 
• GDP growth rate. Annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. A higher value 
strengthens the government ability to pay its debt; 
• GDP per capita. Also called per capita income, measures the average income per 
person in a country; 
• Inflation. Annual increase of average consumer prices, over a period of time. It helps 
governments by reducing the real stock of outstanding debt in domestic currency, but a 
consistent high value is associated with macroeconomic imbalances; 
                                                 
7 Regarding government debt, we have analysed both gross and net government debt separately. 
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• External debt. Also called foreign debt, represents the total debt a country (its 
government, corporations and citizens) owes to foreign creditors. It does not include 
contingent liabilities; 
• Default-in-the-last-year/2-years/5-years/10-years. These variables represent a default 
in the last year, two, five or ten years. The definition of default by Beers and Mavalwalla 
(2016) here used is consistent with the literature on sovereign defaults and considers 
that “a default has occurred when debt service is not paid on the due date, payments are 
not made within the time frame specified under a guarantee or, absent an outright 
payment default, creditors face material economic losses on the sovereign debt they 
hold”. 
3.2. Probit regression framework 
In this work we used both a random effects ordered probit and simple probit panel model, 
similar to what Afonso et al. (2011) used to identify the determinants of sovereign debt credit 
ratings and what Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) used to analyse the impact of split ratings on 
sovereign rating changes. According to Afonso et al. (2011), the ordered and simple probit 
random-effects estimations consider the existence of an additional cross-country error term and 
therefore yield better results using panel data when compared with linear regression methods 
or fixed-effects probit estimations. 
Our approach considers the discrete, ordinal nature of rating differences between credit 
rating agencies. The negative and positive rating differences for each pair of agencies was 
analysed separately due to expected disparate behaviour, comparable to what Al-Sakka and 
ap Gwilym (2010) expected with rating migrations. 
Consider our probit regression setting, when we are regressing Diff_UPitSM as the 
dependent variable (in this case, all observations have the rating from S&P higher or equal than 
the rating from Moody’s). If the resulting coefficient of an explanatory variable, say, real GDP 
growth, is positive and significant, we conclude that an increase in real GDP growth will 
contribute to a bigger difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings8. In a similar way, if the 
coefficient of the level of public debt is negative, we may conclude that an increase in the level 
of public debt, will contribute to a smaller difference between the ratings given by S&P and 
Moody’s9. 
                                                 
8 This could be interpreted as an increase in real GDP growth contributing to a higher S&P rating or a lower 
Moody’s rating. 
9 And in this case this could be interpreted as an increase in the level of public debt contributing to a lower S&P 
rating or a higher Moody’s rating. 
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Our probit specification is defined as follows, and the value of our  dependent variable 
depends on whether we are considering the ordered probit or the simple probit approach: 
 
 
 =  	
	 + _ + +  +  +  !"#$+ %;  %~(0, 1, - = 1, …  (/	. 	  	"/-1,,  = 1, … 2 (/	. 	  !1, 
(1) 
 
where  is an ordinal variable equal to either Diff_UPitAB or Diff_DWitAB. 
On our ordered probit model, Diff_UPitAB (Diff_DWitAB) = 1 or 2 if the rating from 
agency A is higher (lower) than the rating from agency B by one or more-than-one-notch, 
respectively, for sovereign i in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
On our simple probit model, Diff_UPitAB (Diff_DWitAB) = 1 if the rating from agency A 
is higher (lower) than the rating from agency B by one or more notches, for sovereign i in year 
t, and 0 otherwise. 
	
	 may assume the variation value of the budget balance, gross debt, net debt 
or structural balance of country i in year t, depending on the chosen specification10. 
_ - growth rate of GDP for country i in year t.  - GDP per capita variation for country i in year t.  - IPCH percentage change (inflation) for country i in year t.  - external debt variation for country i in year t.  !"#$ - dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country i in year t had defaulted in 
the last Z years, and 0 otherwise. 
In the scope of the ordered probit framework, our six dependent variables were defined 
as to only have values of 1, 2 or 0, representing a rating gap of 1-notch, 2-or-more-notches or 
the inexistence of a rating gap, respectively. Equations 3 and (3 represent how the target 
variables were created: 
 -  345678 = 9:
;1, -  <= − ?< = 12, -  <= − ?< ≥ 20, 	ℎC-1
, Cℎ/ = ≥ ?  (2) 
                                                 





-  DE5678 = 9:
;1, -  <= − ?< = 12, -  <= − ?< ≥ 20, 	ℎC-1
, Cℎ/ = ≤ ?  
where K and  ∈ PQR, SR, QST. 
(3) 
 
A simple probit regression was also run afterwards, and so the dependent variables were 
defined accordingly, by only assuming values of 0 or 1, as one may see in the following 
equations: 
 -  345678 = U1, -  <
= − ?< ≥ 10, 	ℎC-1 , Cℎ/ = ≥ ?  (4) 
 
-  DE5678 = U1, -  <
= − ?< ≥ 10, 	ℎC-1 , Cℎ/ = ≤ ?  
 
where K and  ∈ PQR, SR, QST. 
(5) 
 
This leads to, in the context of the simple probit regression, our dependent variables 
having a value of 1 if there is a rating difference of 1-notch or higher and a value of 0 if the 
ratings from the considered pair of agencies are equivalent in our numerical rating scale. 
Independently of the ordered or simple probit setup, when an observation has equivalent 
ratings from the considered rating agencies, the value of both Diff_UPitαβ and Diff_DWitαβ target 
variables is zero. Therefore, for each agency pair considered, both target variables use the same 
observations with no rating difference.11 
Four different specifications of predicting variables were considered to overcome the 
correlation between some of the variables. Within each specification, the four different default 
dummies were combined. The composition of each specification can be seen on following table. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data 
With regards to the dependent variables, all the sovereign rating changes12 were 
downloaded from Bloomberg and converted into a numerical scale using Table II. Afterwards, 
we created six dependent variables (described in section 0), two variables for each rating agency 
                                                 
11 An observation with = = ?  will make Diff_UPitαβ = Diff_DWitαβ = 0, so it has to be considered on the 
regressions of both target variables. 
12 We used the sovereign issuer ratings for foreign currency denominated debt. 
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pair, with the value of each variable reflecting the numerical rating difference between the 
ratings given by those specific agencies (comparable to what Livingston et al. (2008) did with 
the split rated issues). 
Figure 2 - Total number of countries rated by at least two credit rating agencies, and number of countries 
rated by each pair of the rating agencies considered in this work. 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
The initial objective of this work was to study rating differences from 1970 onwards. 
However, and due to the inexistence of both macroeconomic values for many countries on those 
early years and ratings from at least two of the three selected agencies, our observations 
happened to comprehend only the period between 1980 and 2015. As Figure 2 illustrates, we 
only have observations with a rating from Fitch from 1994 onwards. From 1990 and until 2000, 
we observe a bigger increase in the number or countries rated by at least two agencies, whereas 
from 2000 onwards the pace of this increase slowed, ending with 105 countries in our dataset 
with ratings from at least two of the main rating agencies. 
The distribution of the sovereign ratings on our dataset (seen in Figure 3) show that S&P 
is the agency which assigns more countries a rating of ‘AA-’ or above, and that the great 
majority of our observations are equal or above ‘B-’. A higher degree of agreement on the top 
of the rating scale may explain the number of observations which had a rating of ‘AAA’ from 
















































Figure 3 Distribution of the sovereign ratings composing our dataset. The time periods are 1980 to 2015 
for S&P and Moody’s and 1994 to 2015 for Fitch. 
 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
Our independent variables were obtained from datasets from the IMF (World Economic 
Outlook), World Bank (World Development Indicators), Bank of Canada (Database of 
Sovereign Defaults) and from the Quarterly External Debt Statistics dataset developed in 
collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF. Details on how those variables were 
created can be found in the Appendix. 
4.2. Ordered probit panel results 
4.2.1. Full sample 
We started by running the ordered probit regression with the full dataset. This dataset 
was composed by more than 850 observations for each dependent variable, comprised a period 
of at least 22 years (36 years only for the rating agency pair S&P and Moody’s) and 69 or more 
countries. More than 65% of our observations for each of our target variables had no rating 
difference, whereas a rating difference of 1-notch was found at least in 19% of the observations. 
A rating difference of two or more notches can only be found 3.5%13 of the times when 
analysing comparable ratings from S&P and Fitch; on the other hand, 9%14 of the observations 
                                                 
13 This value was obtained by calculating the average of the percentages of a rating difference of two or more 
notches between S&P and Fitch, when the first gave a higher rating than the latter (Diff_UPitSF) and when the first 
gave a lower rating than the latter (Diff_DWitSF). 
14 This value was obtained by calculating the average of the percentages of a rating difference of two or more 
notches between S&P and Moody’s, when the first gave a higher rating than the latter (Diff_UPitSM) and when the 
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about the rating differences between S&P and Moody’s have a 2-notch rating difference. This 
shows how S&P and Moody’s disagree more when compared with the other rating agency pairs. 
Table III summarizes the full dataset. 
Running the ordered probit regression for the full dataset, when the ratings from S&P 
are higher or equal to Fitch own ratings (Diff_UPitSF dependent variable), we get significant 
values for both budget balance and net debt variables. When budget balance increases, we 
expect the rating difference to decrease. For the net debt predicting variable the opposite occurs: 
when its value increases, the rating difference increases as well. 
With regard to the Diff_DWitSF dependent variable (ratings from S&P being lower or 
equal to Fitch ratings), GDP per capita, external debt and the dummy default-in-the-last-5-years 
variables have statistically significant coefficients on all specifications. One can then conclude 
that if GDP per capita or external debt decrease, the rating difference between those two rating 
agencies increases. The coefficients of the dummy default-in-the-last-5-years are also 
significant (and positive), showing that a default in the last five years increases the rating 
difference between S&P and Fitch in this case. 
 Analysing the rating difference between Moody's and Fitch, when the rating given by 
Moody's is higher than Fitch’s rating (Diff_UPitMF), we find significant values for two 
dependent variables, GDP growth (negative coefficient on two specifications) and external debt 
level (positive coefficients on all specifications). These results show that when GDP growth 
increases, the rating difference between these two agencies becomes smaller, whereas when the 
level of external debt increases, the gap between these two agencies increases. 
When Moody's rating is lower than the rating from Fitch (Diff_DWitMF), we find that the 
dummy variable representing a default in the last five years has a positive coefficient in all 
specifications. For this reason, if a default in the last five years occurred, the rating difference 












Table III Summary of the full dataset, divided by the six target variables. 
 Diff_UPitSF Diff_DWitSF Diff_UPitMF Diff_DWitMF Diff_UPitSM Diff_DWitSM 
No. of countries 87 87 70 69 82 82 
No. of years 22 22 22 22 36 36 
First and last year 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1980-2015 1980-2015 
No. of observations 1149 1194 903 851 1103 1165 
Observations with:       
Rating difference = 0 898 (78%) 898 (75%) 606 (67%) 606 (71%) 764 (69%) 764 (66%) 
Rating difference = 1 221 (19%) 248 (21%) 223 (25%) 187 (22%) 247 (22%) 286 (25%) 
Rating difference = 2 30 (3%) 48 (4%) 74 (8%) 58 (7%) 92 (8%) 115 (10%) 
No. of observations 
with a value: 
      
GDP per capita 1149 (100%) 1194 (100%) 903 (100%) 851 (100%) 1103 (100%) 1165 (100%) 
Real GDP growth 
rate 
1148 (100%) 1194 (100%) 903 (100%) 851 (100%) 1103 (100%) 1165 (100%) 
External debt 841 (73%) 897 (75%) 685 (76%) 648 (76%) 701 (64%) 808 (69%) 
Gov. gross debt 1096 (95%) 1135 (95%) 865 (96%) 807 (95%) 1018 (92%) 1065 (91%) 
Gov. net debt 1046 (91%) 1085 (91%) 822 (91%) 770 (90%) 954 (86%) 1004 (86%) 
Budget balance 1112 (97%) 1153 (97%) 877 (97%) 824 (97%) 1057 (96%) 1104 (95%) 
Structural balance 1064 (93%) 1100 (92%) 842 (93%) 774 (91%) 970 (88%) 1028 (88%) 
Inflation 1147 (100%) 1191 (100%) 901 (100%) 848 (100%) 1100 (100%) 1160 (100%) 
Default in the:       
Last year 312 (27%) 321 (27%) 164 (18%) 211 (25%) 268 (24%) 258 (22%) 
Last two years 349 (30%) 363 (30%) 190 (21%) 247 (29%) 311 (28%) 297 (25%) 
Last five years 419 (36%) 446 (37%) 248 (27%) 313 (37%) 379 (34%) 375 (32%) 
Last ten years 522 (45%) 539 (45%) 331 (37%) 366 (43%) 448 (41%) 454 (39%) 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
The variables gross debt and net debt also have significant values of opposite signs: the 
gross debt contributes negatively for the rating difference, reducing the rating difference when 
its value increases, while the net debt has positive coefficients, so its increase is expected to 
positively influence the magnitude of the rating difference. We need to better understand the 
opposite signs of these two variables, since they should be correlated to a certain degree. The 
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separate regressions of the investment and speculative ratings may shed some light into this 
topic. 
The results from regressing our dependent variable Diff_UPitSM (when the S&P rating is 
higher than Moody's rating), display significant results only for the dummy default variables. 
The dummy default-in-the-last-2-years has positive coefficients on all specifications, meaning 
that if a country defaults in the last two years, the rating gap between S&P and Moody's will 
grow. 
The results from regressing the last set of specifications, when the rating from S&P is 
lower than the rating from Moody's (Diff_UPitSM dependent variable), show that the budget 
balance, gross debt, GDP growth and GDP per capita variables all contribute to the rating 
difference in question. Those first three variables have statistically significant and positive 
coefficients, meaning that when one of those variables increase, the rating difference between 
S&P and Moody's (Diff_UPitSM) will increase as well. The coefficient of the GDP per capita 
variable is negative, so when its value increases, the rating gap between S&P and Moody's 
becomes smaller. 
The main results of running the ordered probit regressions with our full dataset are 














                                                 
15 The full results are available on request. 
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Table IV - Summary of the regressions of the ordered probit full dataset. 
 Significant variables Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 2 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 





Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(-) External debt (16/16) 
(+) Default last 1Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 











Diff_UPitMF (-) GDP growth (9/16) 





Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (2/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 









Diff_UPitSM (+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 









Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (4/16) 









Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) in 
parenthesis. 
 
4.2.2. Differentiation between investment and speculative ratings 
We will now report the ordered probit regression results when the observations used as 
input were divided into two subsets, depending on the value of the average rating given by the 
rating agency pair. The observations with a numeric average rating of 12 or more16 were 
grouped in the investment-grade subset, whereas those with a numeric rating less than 12 were 
grouped in the speculative-grade subset. 
4.2.2.1. Investment-grade subset 
This section will analyse the results from the ordered probit regression when considering 
only observations with an investment-grade average rating. When compared with the full 
                                                 
16 Corresponding to ‘BBB-’ for S&P and Fitch or to ‘Baa3’ for Moody’s. 
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dataset, the investment-grade dataset had observations for a smaller number of countries, 
between 49 and 57 different countries. The adopted criteria of considering only those 
observations with an investment-grade average rating reduced as expected the number of 
observations for each target variable (all target variables had less than 800 observations). It’s 
important to note a higher percentage of observations with the same rating (when compared 
with the full dataset) from each rating agency in this setting, reflecting a greater coherence 
between the studied rating agencies when considering investment-grade sovereigns. This may 
be explained by Livingston et al. (2007) opaqueness idea which associates bond split ratings 
with the opaqueness of the issuer. In this case, investment-grade sovereign issuers disclose more 
detailed information, allowing rating agencies to better evaluate their ability to service debt and 
therefore rating agencies will agree more often about a country’s rating in this context, leading 
to a higher percentage of observations with a rating difference of 0. Table V summarizes the 
dataset used in this section. 
Our regression, when the S&P rating is higher than the rating from Fitch (Diff_UPitSF 
dependent variable), only yield significant results for one of the specifications (only one of the 
regressions show the budget balance variable as significant). This specification shows a positive 
correlation between government net debt and the observed rating difference, when the ratings 
from S&P and Fitch are investment-grade. 
When the rating from S&P is lower than the one from Fitch (Diff_DWitSF), the obtained 
results for all specifications show a negative correlation between GDP per capita and the rating 
difference. This means that when GDP per capita increases, the rating difference is reduced. 
Only one of the regressions in this setting shows a significant and positive default dummy 
variable (the last year one). 
The regressions of our dependent variable Diff_UPitMF (rating from Moody's higher than 
the one from Fitch, with the average classified as investment-grade) showed a positive and 
negative correlation between the rating difference and, respectively, GDP per capita and 
inflation. In this case, when GDP per capita increases, the rating gap increases, whereas with 
an inflation increase, the rating divergence between those two agencies will diminish. 
While analysing the results when we regress the Diff_DWitMF (rating difference when 
the rating from Moody's is lower than the rating from Fitch), we only find one of the regressions 




Table V - Summary of the investment-grade dataset, divided by the six target variables. 
 Diff_UPitSF Diff_DWitSF Diff_UPitMF Diff_DWitMF Diff_UPitSM Diff_DWitSM 
No. of countries 57 56 50 49 52 52 
No. of years 22 22 22 22 36 36 
First and last year 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1980-2015 1980-2015 
No. of observations 773 759 665 555 746 795 
Observations with:       
Rating difference = 0 634 (82%) 634 (84%) 466 (70%) 466 (84%) 568 (76%) 568 (71%) 
Rating difference = 1 124 (16%) 112 (15%) 145 (22%) 64 (12%) 124 (17%) 157 (20%) 
Rating difference = 2 15 (2%) 13 (2%) 54 (8%) 25 (5%) 54 (7%) 70 (9%) 
No. of observations 
with a value: 
      
GDP per capita 773 
(100%) 
759 (100%) 665 (100%) 555 (100%) 746 (100%) 795 (100%) 




759 (100%) 665 (100%) 555 (100%) 746 (100%) 795 (100%) 
External debt 491 (64%) 491 (65%) 462 (69%) 370 (67%) 378 (51%) 472 (59%) 
Gov. gross debt 750 (97%) 735 (97%) 655 (99%) 544 (98%) 693 (93%) 734 (92%) 
Gov. net debt 700 (91%) 675 (89%) 605 (91%) 499 (90%) 641 (86%) 673 (85%) 
Budget balance 753 (97%) 738 (97%) 658 (99%) 547 (99%) 717 (96%) 760 (96%) 
Structural balance 727 (94%) 713 (94%) 643 (97%) 528 (95%) 661 (89%) 709 (89%) 
Inflation 772 
(100%) 
759 (100%) 665 (100%) 555 (100%) 746 (100%) 795 (100%) 
Default in the:       
Last year 74 (10%) 66 (9%) 46 (7%) 42 (8%) 56 (8%) 56 (7%) 
Last two years 87 (11%) 76 (10%) 55 (8%) 52 (9%) 65 (9%) 63 (8%) 
Last five years 117 (15%) 104 (14%) 77 (12%) 73 (13%) 88 (12%) 87 (11%) 
Last ten years 177 (23%) 153 (20%) 124 (19%) 104 (19%) 127 (17%) 130 (16%) 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
All the regressions of the Diff_UPitSM target variable (rating difference when the rating 
from S&P is higher than the rating from Moody's, and, on average, both ratings are investment-
grade) show a significant negative correlation between external debt and the rating difference, 
leading to a smaller rating difference when the level of external debt rises. 
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The last dependent variable, Diff_DWitSM, yield significant results when regressed 
against our predicting variables: both budget balance and government gross debt have 
significant positive coefficients17, meaning that an increase of those variables will lead to an 
increase in the rating difference between S&P and Moody's, when the rating of the first is lower 
than the rating of the latter. 
The GDP growth predicting variable also has significant positive coefficients on two of 
the four regressed specifications, showing an effect on the rating difference similar to the 
described effect of the budget balance and government gross debt on the rating gap. We also 
observe statistically significant and negative coefficients for two of the default dummy 
variables18, meaning that the existence of a default in the last year or two will contribute to a 
smaller rating difference between S&P and Moody's in this case. 
Table VI summarizes the significant results obtained when regressing the investment-
grade subset.19 
Table VI - Summary of the regressions of the ordered probit investment-grade subset. 
 Significant variables Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 2 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (1/4) 





Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (15/16) 





Diff_UPitMF (+) GDP per capita (12/16) 





Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (1/4) -0.1% -0.02% 
Diff_UPitSM (-) External debt (16/16) -0.2%--0.3% -0.04% 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (8/16) 
(-) Default last 1Y (4/4) 











Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) in 
parenthesis. 
 
                                                 
17 With a significance level of 1% for all the relevant regressions. 
18 Default in the last year and in the last two years. 
19 The full results are available on request. 
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4.2.2.2. Speculative-grade subset 
Lastly, the results from the ordered probit regression using the same specifications will 
be analysed, but this time using a subset of the full dataset composed only by observations with 
a speculative-grade average rating. This speculative-grade subset has observations for at least 
38 countries20 and comprehends the period from 1992 to 2015. We have much less observations 
(between 238 and 435 observations) for the speculative-grade dataset when compared with the 
investment-grade and full datasets.  
By analysing Table VII we can observe that the same rating can only be found on 70% 
of the observations for the Diff_UPitSF target variable, reaching as low as 47% of the 
observations for the rating differences between Moody’s and Fitch, when the rating from the 
first is lower than the rating from the latter. This fact reflects how opaque speculative-grade 
sovereigns are and how difficult is for credit rating agencies to assess the real capability of these 
sovereigns to service their debt. This lack of transparency leads to the information available to 
rating agencies having poor quality and increases the probability of a split rating (Al-Sakka and 
ap Gwilym, 2010).  
The first regressions have the Diff_UPitSF as the dependent variable and produce 
significant results for the budget balance and government net debt variables (only one of the 
regressions with this target variable show the dummy default-in-the-last-5-years variable as 
significant). The budget balance coefficient is negative, leading to a smaller rating difference 
between S&P and Fitch when the budget balance grows. Government net debt has the opposite 
effect on the described rating difference: when it increases, the rating disparity between those 
two agencies increases as well. 
With regards to the obtained results when regressing the Diff_DWitSF variable, it is 
possible to observe that government net debt, GDP growth, external debt level and the dummy 
default-in-the-last-10-years variables all have an effect on the rating difference between S&P 
and Fitch, when the rating from the first is lower than the rating from the latter. The government 
net debt variable has a positive coefficient, increasing the rating difference when its value 
increases. The remaining significant variables (GDP growth, external debt level and the dummy 
default variable) have negative coefficients, so when their value increases (or becomes one, in 
the case of the dummy variable), the rating difference between S&P and Fitch shrinks. 
 
                                                 




Table VII - Summary of the speculative-grade dataset, divided by the six target variables. 
 Diff_UPitSF Diff_DWitSF Diff_UPitMF Diff_DWitMF Diff_UPitSM Diff_DWitSM 
No. of countries 54 53 42 38 50 51 
No. of years 22 22 22 22 23 24 
First and last year 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1994-2015 1993-2015 1992-2015 
No. of observations 376 435 238 296 357 370 
Observations with:       
Rating difference = 0 264 (70%) 264 (61%) 140 (59%) 140 (47%) 196 (55%) 196 (53%) 
Rating difference = 1 97 (26%) 136 (31%) 78 (33%) 123 (42%) 123 (34%) 129 (35%) 
Rating difference = 2 15 (4%) 35 (8%) 20 (8%) 33 (11%) 38 (11%) 45 (12%) 
No. of observations 
with a value: 
      
GDP per capita 376 (100%) 435 (100%) 238 (100%) 296 (100%) 357 (100%) 370 (100%) 
Real GDP growth 
rate 
376 (100%) 435 (100%) 238 (100%) 296 (100%) 357 (100%) 370 (100%) 
External debt 350 (93%) 406 (93%) 223 (94%) 278 (94%) 323 (90%) 336 (91%) 
Gov. gross debt 346 (92%) 400 (92%) 210 (88%) 263 (89%) 325 (91%) 331 (89%) 
Gov. net debt 346 (92%) 410 (94%) 217 (91%) 271 (92%) 313 (88%) 331 (89%) 
Budget balance 359 (95%) 415 (95%) 219 (92%) 277 (94%) 340 (95%) 344 (93%) 
Structural balance 337 (90%) 387 (89%) 199 (84%) 246 (83%) 309 (87%) 319 (86%) 
Inflation 375 (100%) 432 (99%) 236 (99%) 293 (99%) 354 (99%) 365 (99%) 
Default in the:       
Last year 238 (63%) 255 (59%) 118 (50%) 169 (57%) 212 (59%) 202 (55%) 
Last two years 262 (70%) 287 (66%) 135 (57%) 195 (66%) 246 (69%) 234 (63%) 
Last five years 302 (80%) 342 (79%) 171 (72%) 240 (81%) 291 (82%) 288 (78%) 
Last ten years 345 (92%) 986 (89%) 207 (87%) 262 (89%) 321 (90%) 324 (88%) 
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
 
Only one of the specifications yield significant results when regressing the Diff_UPitMF 
variable (rating difference between Moody's and Fitch, with a higher rating from the first 
agency). External debt has positive and significant coefficients on two of the regressions, 
therefore when its value increases, the analysed rating difference increases as well. Two of the 
four dummy default variables (default in the last year and in the last five years) have significant 
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negative coefficients, thus when a default happened in the last year or in the last five years, the 
rating difference will get smaller. 
The regression of the Diff_DWitMF target variable against the different specifications of 
predicting variables highlights the effect of government gross debt and inflation on the rating 
difference between Moody's and Fitch, when the first is lower than the latter (the dummy 
default-in-the-last-10-years variable only yielded significant and negative results for one of the 
regressions). Both gross debt and inflation contribute negatively to the rating gap, therefore, the 
rating difference will shrink if one of those variables increases. 
Table VIII - Summary of the regressions of the ordered probit speculative-grade subset. 
 Significant variables 
(Coefficient sign) 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 1 
Marginal Effect 
Rating difference = 2 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 







Diff_DWitSF (+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) External debt (15/16) 









Diff_UPitMF (+) External debt (2/16) 
(-) Default last Y (1/4) 







Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (4/4) 
(-) Inflation (4/4) 







Diff_UPitSM (-) Net debt (4/4) -0.2% -0.06% 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance (3/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 







Note: Coefficient signs and number of significant regressions (besides the total number of run regressions) in 
parenthesis. 
 
All the ordered probit regressions run with Diff_UPitSM as the dependent variable show 
that the government net debt contributes negatively to the rating difference, when the S&P 
rating is higher than the rating from Moody's. As a result, when the government net debt 
increases, the rating gap between S&P and Moody's shrinks. 
The results from regressing the Diff_DWitSM target variable show a positive and a 
negative correlation between the rating difference (when the rating from S&P is lower than the 
one from Moody's) and, respectively, the budget balance on one hand, and GDP per capita and 
26 
 
external debt on the other hand. For this reason, when the budget balance increases, the 
considered rating gap increases; whereas, when GDP per capita or external debt increase, the 
same rating gap decreases. 
Table VIII summarizes the significant results obtained when regressing the speculative-grade 
subset21. 
 
4.3. Simple probit panel results 
When regressing our target variables (Diff_UPitSF, Diff_DWitSF, Diff_UPitMF, 
Diff_DWit
MF, Diff_UPitSM and Diff_DWitSM) with the ordered probit framework, we found that 
only 3% to 10% of our observations had a rating gap of 2-notches or higher (this can be seen 
on the summary of Table III). Therefore, we decided to run a simple probit regression for the 
same observations subsets already used: we first considered the full dataset, and afterwards we 
split it into two subsets (an investment-grade and a speculative-grade dataset) depending on the 
average rating of the observation. 
4.3.1. Full sample 
Regressing our target variables with a simple probit model produced significant results 
for all specifications. Our regressions, when the ratings from S&P are higher than Fitch own 
ratings, show that both budget balance and government net debt have an effect on the rating 
difference between those two agencies. In the first case, when the budget balance grows, the 
rating difference shrinks, whereas when the government net debt increases, the rating difference 
will increase as well. 
The results of regressing Diff_DWitSF highlight the influence of GDP per capita and the 
dummy default-in-the-last-5-years variable.22 When GDP per capita grows, S&P and Fitch will 
update their ratings, resulting in a smaller rating difference. The opposite happens when there 
is a default in the last five years: in this case, the rating disagreement between those two 
agencies will grow. 
Our regressions also produce significant results when a positive rating difference 
between Moody’s and Fitch (represented by the Diff_UPitMF dependent variable) exists. All the 
regressions show a positive correlation between external debt and the rating difference (so when 
external debt increases, the rating gap gets bigger as well). 
                                                 
21 The full results are available on request. 




The structural balance variable also impacts on the rating difference, because of its 
significant and negative coefficients. When structural balance increases for a given country, we 
can expect the rating difference between Moody’s and Fitch to become smaller. 
The regressions of our Diff_DWitMF dependent variable show that government net debt 
and two of the dummy default variables are all positively correlated with the rating difference. 
As a consequence, when a country’s net debt increases or a default happens in the last two or 
five years, we may expect a bigger rating difference between Moody’s and Fitch. 
The results of regressing the Diff_UPitSM dependent variable only produce significant 
coefficients for one of the specifications. In specification (4), the external debt predicting 
variable had a significant and negative coefficient for all the regressions, so when its value 
increased, the rating difference between S&P and Moody’s would become smaller. Two 
regressions of this specification also exposed the positive correlation between a default in the 
last five or 10 years and an increase of the rating difference. 
Finally, the simple probit regressions of the Diff_DWitSM variable reveal a positive 
correlation between the rating difference and each one of the budget balance, government gross 
debt and GDP growth dependent variables. Therefore, when one of the previous variables 
increases, one may expect a bigger rating gap between S&P and Moody’s. In contrast, and 
derived from the significant and negative coefficients of the GDP per capita variable, when its 
value increases, one may expect the ratings from S&P and Moody’s to converge. 
4.3.2. Differentiation between investment and speculative ratings 
4.3.2.1. Investment-grade subset 
The regressions of our Diff_UPitSF target variable only showed positive and significant 
coefficients for the government net debt variable. For this reason, when the government net 
debt increases, one can expect a bigger rating difference between S&P and Fitch. 
When analysing the results of regressing our observations when the rating from S&P 
was lower or equal to the rating from Fitch (i.e., Diff_DWitSF dependent variable), we found that 
both GDP per capita and inflation have significant coefficient values with opposite signs23. 
While an increase of GDP per capita will decrease the rating difference, an inflation increase 
will contribute to a bigger rating difference between those two agencies. 
Our regressions of the variable Diff_UPitMF showed that budget balance, structural 
balance, inflation and the dummy variable default-in-the-last-10-years all have negative and 
                                                 
23 Only one of the regressions showed a positive coefficient for the dummy variable representing a country default 
in the last year. 
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significant coefficients. Thus, with an increase of those variables (or the existence of a default 
in the last ten years), one may expect a reduction in the rating gap between Moody’s and Fitch, 
in this context. We also found two regressions producing positive and significant coefficients 
for the GDP per capita variable. 
By regressing our observations when Moody’s rating is lower than Fitch own rating 
(i.e., when regressing Diff_DWitMF), we found that government net debt had positive 
coefficients for all the regressions using it. On the other hand, only one of the regressions 
disclosed a negative coefficient for the government gross debt variable. With this in mind, one 
may expect an increase of the rating difference when net debt increases, while an increase of 
the government gross debt will shrink the rating difference. 
We find that both external debt and GDP per capita variables have significant and 
negative coefficients when regressing those observations with a higher rating from S&P than 
from Moody’s (Diff_UPitSM dependent variable). As a result, when one of those variables 
increases, the rating gap between S&P and Moody’s will get smaller. 
Lastly, our regressions of the Diff_DWitSM target variable yield significant results for 
three of the four dummy default variables (default in the last year, two and five years), structural 
balance, GDP growth, budget balance and government gross debt variables. The structural 
balance and the default in the last year/2-years/5-years dummy predicting variables have a 
negative coefficient, leading to a smaller rating difference between S&P and Moody’s when 
they increase. On the other hand, the remaining variables (GDP growth, budget balance and the 
government gross debt) have positive coefficients, increasing the considered rating gap when 
they increase. 
4.3.2.2. Speculative-grade subset 
Our simple probit regressions of the speculative-grade dataset produced significant 
results across all the sovereign rating difference target variables. 
By regressing the Diff_UPitSF target variable with the speculative-grade dataset, we find 
that the budget balance and government net debt variables both have significant coefficients24: 
when the budget balance grows, the rating difference between S&P and Fitch becomes smaller, 
whereas when the government net debt grows, the same rating gap is expected to grow as well. 
The results of regressing the Diff_DWitSF target variable show that GDP growth and three 
of the four dummy default variables contribute to a smaller rating difference between S&P and 
                                                 
24 Two of these regressions also show significant and negative coefficients for the dummy variables representing 
a default in the last two and five years. 
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Fitch, when the rating from the first is lower than the rating from the latter, whereas the 
government net debt variable has a significant and positive correlation with the rating 
difference, triggering a bigger rating difference when its value grows. 
In contrast to the regressions of the great majority of our target variables, the simple 
probit regressions of the Diff_UPitMF variable only produced significant coefficients for two of 
the regressions: the negative coefficients of the dummy variables representing a default in the 
last year and in the last five years show how a default in those past periods will contribute to a 
smaller rating gap between Moody’s and Fitch, when the rating from the first is higher than the 
rating from the latter. 
All regressions of the Diff_DWitMF target variable show that an inflation increase lead to 
a smaller rating difference when the rating from Moody’s is lower than the rating from Fitch. 
The regressions which used the specification with the structural balance variable also showed 
a positive and significant correlation between external debt and the rating difference. Thus, 
when external debt increases, the rating divergence between Moody’s and Fitch will grow. 
When running our simple probit regressions for the observations with the rating from 
S&P higher than Moody’s rating, we find that government net debt has a negative coefficient, 
so when its value grows, our target variable Diff_UPitSM will become smaller. 
Lastly, we analyse the result of our simple probit regressions of the Diff_DWitSM variable 
with the speculative-grade dataset. These regressions show that both GDP per capita and 
government gross debt variables have statistically significant coefficients. In the first case, the 
negative coefficients of GDP per capita indicate that when its value increases, the rating 
difference shrinks, whereas in the latter case, the positive coefficients of the government gross 
debt variable show that when gross debt gets bigger, the rating difference, when the rating from 
S&P is lower than the rating from Moody’s, also increases. 
The following table summarises the results from the different regressions run for all 





Table IX - Comparison of the results obtained with the random-effects ordered and simple probit estimations for the full, investment-grade and 
speculative-grade datasets. 
 Full dataset Investment-grade dataset Speculative-grade dataset 
Significant 
variables 
Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results 
Diff_UPitSF (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Budget balance (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) (-) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(-) Budget balance (3/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
Diff_DWitSF (-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(-) External debt (16/16) 
(+) Default last 1Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (16/16) 
(+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (15/16) 
(+) Default last 1Y (1/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Inflation (13/16) 
(+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) External debt (15/16) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) Default last 10Y (3/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP growth (15/16) 
(-) Default last Y (2/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (2/4) 
(-) Default last 10Y (4/4) 
Diff_UPitMF (-) GDP growth (9/16) 
(+) External debt (16/16) 
(-) Structural balance (3/4) 
(+) External debt (16/16) 
(+) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(-) Inflation (16/16) 
(+) GDP per capita (2/16) 
(-) Inflation (13/16) 
(-) Budget balance (1/4) 
(-) Structural balance (4/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(+) External debt (2/16) 
(-) Default last Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(-) Default last Y (1/4) 





 Full dataset Investment-grade dataset Speculative-grade dataset 
Significant 
variables 
Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results Ordered probit results Simple probit results 
Diff_DWitMF (-) Gross debt (2/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (3/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) Gross debt (1/4) (-) Gross debt (1/4) 
(+) Net debt (4/4) 
(-) Gross debt (4/4) 
(-) Inflation (4/4) 
(-) Default last 10Y (1/4) 
(+) External debt (4/16) 
(-) Inflation (16/16) 
Diff_UPitSM (+) Default last Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 10Y (1/4) 
(-) External debt (4/16) 
(+) Default last 5Y (1/4) 
(+) Default last 10Y (1/4) 
(-) External debt (16/16) (-) External debt (16/16) 
(-) GDP per capita (8/16) 
(-) Net debt (4/4) (-) Net debt (4/4) 
Diff_DWitSM (+) Budget balance 
(+) Gross debt 
(+) GDP growth 
(-) GDP per capita 
(+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (4/16) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (8/16) 
(-) Default last 1Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(+) Budget balance (4/4) 
(-) Structural balance (2/4) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(+) GDP growth (13/16) 
(-) Default last Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 2Y (4/4) 
(-) Default last 5Y (4/4) 
(-) External debt (4/16) 
(+) Budget balance (3/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 
(+) Gross debt (4/4) 
(-) GDP per capita (12/16) 






By regressing the rating differences of the three main rating agencies with both an 
ordered and a simple probit random-effects model, we find some significant results, 
indicating the influence of some of our explanatory variables on those rating differences. 
We used an ordered probit model, due to both the existence of rating differences 
above two notches and Al-Sakka and ap Gwilym (2010) approach to the split ratings 
topic. Nonetheless, and as a result of a lower percentage of rating differences higher than 
one notch, a simple probit model was also used to find if it improved on the results 
previously obtained. 
For the rating differences between S&P and Fitch, when the assigned rating from the 
first was higher than the latter, we found that, independently of the dataset (full, 
investment- or speculative-grade), an increase in the budget balance would decrease the 
rating difference whereas an increase in net debt would increase that same difference. For 
the speculative-grade ratings, we also found that the existence of a default in the last two 
or five years would decrease the rating difference between S&P and Fitch. 
When the rating from S&P is lower than the one from Fitch, we find different 
behaviours when comparing the results from the investment- and speculative-grade 
datasets: in the first case, GDP per capita contributes for a smaller rating gap, whereas a 
default in the last year and inflation contribute for a bigger rating difference. In the latter 
case, only net debt has an increasing effect on the rating difference; external debt, GDP 
growth and the existence of a default in the last year, two or ten years reduce the rating 
difference. 
The results of our regressions when Moody’s assigns a higher sovereign rating than 
Fitch are less precise. On the other hand, GDP per capita and inflation respectively 
influence an investment-grade rating difference in a positive and negative way, external 
debt and a default in the last year or five years respectively increase and decrease the 
analogous speculative rating difference. When considering only the investment-grade 
regressions, our simple probit results also find the budget and structural balances and a 
default in the last five years as negatively correlated with the rating difference. On the 
other hand, for the speculative-grade results for Moody’s and Fitch positive rating 
differences, the simple probit approach does not find external debt as significant, when 




the fact that GDP growth only appears as significant for the ordered probit regressions 
with the full dataset. 
With regard to a rating difference when Moody’s assigns a lower rating than Fitch, a 
higher level of government gross debt leads to a smaller rating difference for both 
investment- and speculative-grade datasets, with the exception of the simple probit 
regressions for speculative rating differences, which did not find gross debt significant. 
Our simple probit regressions with the investment-grade dataset also find net debt to 
positively affect the rating difference. Inflation is found to negatively influence a rating 
difference between Moody’s and Fitch when the ratings are in the speculative category 
(irrespective of the chosen probit approach), and a default on the last ten years affect in 
the same negative way only the rating differences within the ordered probit results. 
Looking at the results obtained for the positive rating difference between S&P and 
Moody’s for the investment-grade dataset, we find that an increase in the level of external 
debt leads to a smaller rating gap between those two rating agencies. For the same dataset, 
we find that the simple probit approach also identifies GDP per capita as negatively 
correlated with the rating difference. For the speculative-grade dataset, both probit 
methods show net debt as negatively related with the rating difference. It’s important to 
note that for this specific dependent variable, and contrary to what was seen on the 
regressions of the investment- and speculative- data subsets, only the regressions with the 
full dataset showed all four default dummy variables as significant and affecting 
positively the rating gap. 
The last dependent variable represents the negative rating difference between S&P 
and Moody’s (that is, a lower rating from S&P than from Moody’s). Both of our probit 
regressions with the investment-grade dataset show a positive relation between budget 
balance, gross debt and GDP growth and the rating difference and a negative relation 
between a default in the last year or two and the same rating difference. The simple probit 
results also point to the structural balance and a default in the last five years as 
contributing negatively to the rating difference. When considering the speculative-grade 
dataset, our results both show that an increase in GDP per capita leads to a smaller rating 
difference. Both budget balance and gross debt affect the rating difference positively, the 
former only for the ordered probit regressions and the latter only for the simple probit 





There are a few improvements and further questions that may be addressed in the 
future, in the scope of this work. One could also find a way of specifying which agency 
is responsible for the rating difference, or as an alternative, discover which factors, in a 
split rating situation, are correlated with a specific agency upgrade or downgrade. 
Another question that can be further assessed is considering different time periods, 
for instance a period before the 1997 Asian crisis, or periods before and after the 2008-
2009 economic and financial crisis, possibly reflecting differences on how the rating 
agencies methodologies were applied in those specific periods. 
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Appendix - Explanatory variables and country sample 
Table A1 - Summary of the explanatory variables 
Predicting 
variables 





GGR_NGDP: General government 
revenue (percentage of GDP) 
GGX_NGDP: General government total 
expenditure (percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
Difference between government 




General government structural balance 
(percentage of potential GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
GGXWDG_NGDP Gross debt General government gross debt 
(percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
GGXWDN_NGDP Net debt General government net debt 
(percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
NGDP_RPCH GDP growth 
rate 
Gross domestic product, constant prices 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
Annual percentages of constant price 
GDP, year-on-year changes. 
NGDPDPC GDP per 
capita 
Gross domestic product per capita, 
current prices, expressed in current U.S. 
dollars per person. 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
 
PCPIPCH Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices 
Source: IMF (WEO) 
Annual percentages of average 




GNI_USD: Gross National Income 
(current US$) 
Source: WB (WDI) 
 
ExtDebtStocksTotalUSD: External debt 
stocks, total (DOD, current US$) 
Source: WB (WDI) 
 
GrossExtDebtPosition: 0059_T1_Gross 
External Debt Position and External 
debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$) 
Source: JE (QEDS) 
The WDI dataset had GNI values for 
the great majority of countries, so the 
GNI values came from the WDI 
dataset. 
The External Debt values existed on 
the WDI dataset, but there were no 
values for OECD countries and the 
QEDS dataset will replace the WDI 
dataset as the canonical source for 
external debt. 
However, the QEDS dataset only have 
values from 2003 onwards, so we first 
used the external debt values from the 
WDI dataset 
(ExtDebtStocksTotalUSD), and then 
we merged the values from the QEDS 
dataset when available 
(GrossExtDebtPosition). Since the 
QEDS dataset is more recent and uses 
an updated methodology, those values 





The variable ExtDebtPercGNI was 
calculated using the combined external 
debt values (from WDI and QEDS 
dataset) and the GNI value, and its 
value equals the external debt value in 
percentage of GNI. 
DefaultLastYear Default in 
the last year 
CRAG database has the values of debt 
defaulted by countries along the years, 
distributed by type of creditor (and the 
definition of 'default' used by the 
authors is consistent with much of the 
literature on sovereign defaults). 
The debt value defaulted by country 
and year was processed and converted 
into a boolean variable named 
DefaultThisYear (1 if the country, in 
that year, had debt defaulted; 0 
otherwise). Afterwards, the variables 
DefaultLastYear, DefaultLast2Years, 
DefaultLast5Years and 
DefaultLast10Years were created, 
assuming the value 1 if the value 
DefaultThisYear had the value 1 in the 
previous year/two years/five years/ten 
years, for the same country, and 0 
otherwise. 
DefaultLast2Years Default in 
the last two 
years 
DefaultLast5Years Default in 
the last five 
years 
DefaultLast10Years Default in 
the last ten 
years 
Note: The sources of information used in this work were the World Economic Outlook dataset (WEO) from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank 
(WB) and the Quarterly External Debt Statistics dataset (QEDS) from the Joint Effort of the WB and the 
IMF. The variables BudgetBal_NGDP, GGSB_NPGDP, GGXWDG_NGDP, GGXWDN_NGDP, 
NGDPDPC and ExtDebtPercGNI are expressed in terms of their year-to-year variation. 
 
Countries in the sample: Angola, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Belize, 
Brazil, Barbados, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Gabon, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iraq, 
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Malaysia, Namibia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, El Salvador, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Seychelles, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States of 




Table A2 - Countries in our full dataset which in the previous period did not have ratings from 
two or more of the three main agencies. 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Australia   Denmark Argentina Barbados Bahrain Albania Angola 
Austria   Finland Belgium Belize Cameroon Azerbaijan Armenia 
United 





Norway   Malaysia Canada Costa Rica El Salvador 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ethiopia 
Sweden   New Zealand Chile Croatia Ghana Fiji Honduras 
    Spain China Ecuador Guatemala Gabon Iraq 
    Thailand Colombia Egypt Mali Georgia Namibia 
      Czech Republic Estonia Mongolia Jordan Paraguay 
      France India Mozambique Kenya Rwanda 
      Germany Jamaica Saudi Arabia Libya Senegal 
      Greece Kazakhstan Serbia Nigeria Zambia 
      Hungary Korea (Republic of) Sri Lanka Seychelles   
      Iceland Kuwait Ukraine Uganda   
      Indonesia Lebanon Viet Nam 
United Arab 
Emirates   
      Israel Morocco       
      Italy Oman       
      Japan Panama       
      Luxembourg Papua New Guinea       
      Mexico Peru       
      Netherlands Qatar       
      Pakistan Romania       
      Philippines Russian Federation       
      Poland Slovenia       
      Portugal 
Trinidad and 
Tobago       
      South Africa Tunisia       
      Switzerland         
      Turkey         
      United States         
      Uruguay         
Source: rating agencies and own calculations. 
